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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. As was stated by Dr. Sorensen's 
initial Petition to this Court for Writ of Certiorari, it involves 
errors made by the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals in the 
valuation and distribution of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice, and 
the requirement that Dr. Sorensen pay a portion of Mrs. Sorensen's 
expert witness fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Sorensen relies on the Statement of Facts set forth in 
pages 3 through 8 of his Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CASES CITED AND RELIED UPON BY DR. SORENSEN 
CORRECTLY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
ANY GOODWILL ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS DENTAL 
PRACTICE AS MARITAL PROPERTY IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH PRIOR UTAH DECISIONS AND INVOLVES AN 
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW TO BE SETTLED 
BY THIS COURT. 
Respondent criticizes the authority relied upon by Dr. 
Sorensen which demonstrates the inconsistencies of the Sorensen 
decision with other decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and this 
Court. That authority, however, firmly supports a review by this 
Court of the proceedings below to rectify the unfairness to Dr. 
Sorensen in the overall property distribution. 
Respondent correctly notes that this Court's decision in 
Jackson v. Caldwell. 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966) involved 
the dissolution of a business partnership and whether or not 
goodwill existed so as to be distributed upon dissolution. The 
rule in that case is still the law in Utah and applies equally to 
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assets acquired in a marriage partnership: i.e., there can be no 
goodwill of a business which depends for its existence upon the 
qualities of the persons who carry it on (e.g. professionals such 
as lawyers, doctors, accounts and dentists). Id. at 670. 
Dr. Sorensen's situation falls squarely within the Jackson 
exception and requires that any "goodwill11 of his practice not be 
considered as a marital asset. Dr. Sorensen is a solo practitioner 
who's successful practice is entirely dependent on his personal 
reputation, skill and presence in that practice. Consistent with 
Jackson, supra, any "goodwill" attributable to Dr. Sorensen is 
personal, therefore, not an asset subject to distribution. 
The decisions of the Utah Courts had been consistent with the 
Jackson rule until the Utah Court of Appeals handed down its 
Sorensen decision. In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 
1988) , this Court remanded the case for a valuation of Dr. 
Gardner's interest, including any goodwill, attributable to his 
medical practice. There, however, the practice was a business 
concern known as the Ogden Clinic consisting of twenty-three 
doctors which would in all likelihood continue were Dr. Gardner to 
disassociate from it. Unlike Sorensen, the success of that 
business did not depend upon attributes personal and peculiar to 
a solo practitioner. In Stevens v. Stevens. 754 P.2d 952 (Utah CA 
1988), the Utah Court of Appeals reaffirmed the general rule that 
goodwill is subject to equitable distribution but equally 
recognized the Jackson exception in not awarding Mrs. Stevens 
"goodwill" value in her husband's business. Id. at 956-957. [See 
also, Docru v. Docru, 552 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982) at 1309, where this 
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Court affirmed the trial court's valuation and distribution of a 
solo practitioner's anesthesiology practice to him, noting that 
aside from liquid assets and receivables, the corporation's only 
value was in the doctor's continued ability to work.] 
In summary, the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Sorensen upholding the trial court's distribution of "goodwill" 
value of Dr. Sorensen's solo dental practice is an aberration from 
both the logic and the law articulated in prior Utah decisions. 
Utah aligns herself with those states determining that "goodwill" 
is not subject to valuation and distribution upon divorce where an 
individual solo practitioner is concerned. [See, Nail v. Nail, 486 
S.W.2d, 761 (Tex. 1972), Powell v. Powell, 648 P.2d 218 (Kan. 
1982), In Re: Marriage of Wielder, 461 N.E.2d 447 (111. at 1983), 
Tavlor v. Tavlor, 386 N.W.2d 851 (Neb. 1986)]. 
Furthermore, the evidence at trial demonstrates that any 
"goodwill" value attributable to Dr. Sorensen's practice existed 
prior to the parties' marriage. As such, it should remain separate 
property of Dr. Sorensen and not be subject to distribution upon 
divorce. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988); 
Preston v. Preston, 649 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982). 
POINT II 
MRS. SORENSEN HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS DECISION 
INCLUDING DR. SORENSEN'S ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
IN THE VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HIS 
PRACTICE, WHILE ALSO REQUIRING HIM TO PAY CHILD 
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY FROM THESE RECEIVABLES. 
The Respondent argues that there is no legal preclusion 
barring the valuation and distribution of accounts receivable in 
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the property distribution upon divorce. She fails to recognize, 
however, that to do so is unjustifiably unfair to Dr. Sorensen's 
situation. Dr. Sorensen's income is his accounts receivable as 
received. This is the same income upon which the trial court based 
its award of child support and alimony. In also considering the 
accounts receivable as property for distribution, the courts below 
have given Mrs. Sorensen a double-dip: support based on Dr. 
Sorensen's income in addition to property values to off-set the 
accounts receivables (income as received) awarded to Dr. Sorensen. 
POINT III 
THE OMISSION OF $10,129 OF DR. SORENSEN'S 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE IN THE OVERALL PROPERTY 
DISTRIBUTION WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Dr. Sorensen acknowledges that a division of marital assets 
need not be mathematically precise to be upheld as equitable. 
However, it stretches the imagination that an error of over $10,000 
(10% of the total value assigned to the practice) can be deemed to 
even approach fairness much less mathematical precision. This is 
particularly true in Sorensen. where the error pertains to the 
valuation of one of the major assets of the marriage. The Court 
of Appeals should have determined that the oversight by the trial 
court in failing to include $10,129 in accounts payable when 
valuing and distributing the marital property was not "harmless 
error." A Writ of Certiorari should issue to review and rectify 
this inequity. 
POINT IV 
MRS. SORENSEN HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' AWARD OF EXPERT WITNESS 
FEES CONFORMS WITH ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW. 
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Mrs. Sorensen contends that her expert witness served both 
parties and, therefore, his fee should be split evenly. However, 
much of Mr. Heiskanen's fees were incurred in the preparation for 
testifying on Mrs. Sorensen's behalf. Furthermore, the parties' 
stipulation expressly required the trial court to decide the issue. 
Contrary to this Court's holding in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 
1380 (Utah 1980), the trial court required Dr. Sorensen to 
contribute to respondent's expert fees. The Court of Appeals' 
decision upholding the trail court's award of expert fees to Mrs. 
Sorensen was error and contrary to established Utah law. A Writ 
of Certiorari on this issue should be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Sorensen's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be 
granted as to each issue to allow this Court to rectify the 
inequities created in the courts below. 
Dated: July 17, 1989. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
fK^nt M. Kasting 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner 
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